Recent reports from both the Taiwanese and Japanese defense ministries indicate that the Shandong carrier group (SCG) is finishing its first Western Pacific training and heading back to its home port of Yulin Naval Base, Hainan Island.

This article discusses the April 2023 deployment and compares it to the August 2022 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) exercise, and the less discussed Liaoning carrier group deployment to the Western Pacific in December 2022.

The PLA Navy (PLAN) commissioned the Shandong (CV-17) on December 17, 2019, and it is its first indigenously built carrier. The April 2023 SCG included the following five ships during the April 8-10 exercise east of Taiwan: carrier Chinese Naval Ship (CNS) Shandong (17), destroyer CNS Jiaozuo (163), frigate CNS Liuzhou (573), frigates CNS Xuchang (536), and fleet oiler CNS Chaganhu (905).

Press reports indicated that this deployment was "the first time that the Shandong has sailed in the Pacific Ocean. Chinese media also said it is the Shandong’s first exercise in the West Pacific as its regular operation area is the South China Sea." Two other PLAN ships later joined the SCG including the guided missile destroyer CNS Changsha (173) with 64 vertical launch system missiles and missile destroyer CNS Xi'an (106) for a total of seven ships.

US Fleet Tracker as of 10 April 2023 (USNI News Graphic)

US Navy’s response

During the SCG’s transit through the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines, the USS Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (Nimitz CSG) shadowed its movements about 200 nautical miles away, especially when it conducted aggressive exercises after President Tsai Ing-wen met with US Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy on 5 April 2023 in California.

A total of 67 US naval ships are operationally assigned to the 7th Fleet (Western Pacific). This amounts to 63 percent of the 107 deployed US naval ships (USS and USNS) around the world. Another 21 percent (23) are assigned to 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean and 9 percent (10) to the 5th Fleet in the Arabian Gulf. Besides the Nimitz CSG, three other flattops are operating near Taiwan, Japan and Korea:

• America Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)


• Ronald Reagan CSG


• Makin Island ARG & 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU):


• An unknown number of US Navy nuclear submarines (SSNs and SSBNs) are operating in the Indo-Pacific area.


• The US Air Force has numerous bases in the area that could also respond to escalating tensions.

Red indicates the locations of the SCG and white indicates the locations of the Nimitz CSG. (Reddit photo)

Taiwan’s Naval response

According to Taiwan’s Defense Minister, the ROC Navy deployed a Kang Ding-class frigate and a Cheng Kung-class frigate to shadow within five to six miles of the SCG deployment. The ROC Coast Guard (CG) patrol vessel, the Hsinchu, closely monitored the Chinese Coast Guard’s (CCG) Haixun 06 in the Taiwan Strait.

Japan's Self-Defense Force (JASDF) response

The JASDF kept tabs on the SCG deployment by shadowing the SCG with the Japanese guided-missile destroyer JS Sawagiri (DD-157) and the JS Sazanami (DD-113). The JASDF carefully watched the CCG’s actions in the Taiwan Strait because of the concern that the CCG could also disrupt Japanese commercial shipping.

(Japan Ministry of Defense photo)

Summary of the Joint Sword Exercise and the SCG Deployment

During the three-day Joint Sword exercise (April 8-10), the Shandong carrier flew J-15 Shark aircraft and Z-18 and Z-9 helicopters as pictured above from the Japanese Defense Joint Staff. During the April 8-10, the Shandong flew 80 J-15 launch and recoveries and 40 helicopter takeoffs and landings. From April 7-24, the carrier launched and recovered aircraft approximately 620 times according to Japan’s Joint Staff reporting.

The below map shows the SCG’s locations from April 7-9. Note that the Japanese highlighted the SCG’s close proximity to its southern islands, specifically the Miyakojima islands.

(Japan Ministry of Defense photo)

The entire SCG Western Pacific deployment is depicted below. Number 1 with a circle on the map refers to the location of the SCG at 8 am on April 7, 2 is April 8, and so forth until 18 which refers to April 24.

(Japan Ministry of Defense photo)

The meaning of the first domestically developed aircraft carrier in China for this exercise

China has demonstrated by building its own Shandong (Type 002) aircraft carrier (a modified version of the Type 001 Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier) that it is beginning its journey to becoming a great naval power. The Fujian CV-18 (Type 003) carrier is the PLA’s first fixed-wing aircraft carrier with a fully indigenous design. However, being able to build an aircraft carrier does not make China a world naval power, yet. It is worth recalling that China bought its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning (CV-16), from Ukraine in 2012 as a refurbished Soviet Kuznetsov-class cruiser carrier.

The PLA Navy has not taken its aircraft carriers around the world to fight a war. This is a baby step for China. It will take years for the PLA Navy to be able to be fully trained and prepared for a war using its aircraft carriers. However, China is reportedly on schedule to have five aircraft carriers by 2030, having launched its third, the Fujian (CV-18), on June 17, 2022.

(Twitter user @JINTEL photo)

Key differences between the April 2023 and August 2022 PLA exercises

Janes, a global open-source intelligence company specializing in military, national security, aerospace, and transport, used multiple sources to create an overall graphic map summarizing the April 8-10 PLA "Joint Sword" exercise (see above). The graphic demonstrates that the PLAN and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) surged many forces around Taiwan simultaneously during the exercise. The circled numbers in the graphic indicate the dates in April where the weapons systems were located.

The August 4-15, 2022 exercise following Speaker Pelosi’s visit and the April 8-10, 2023 exercise were similar, except for some of the following key differences:

• No PLA Navy aircraft carrier had positioned itself on the east side of Taiwan during the August 2022 exercise. The PLA used the east side of Taiwan in August as an exercise area and a missile landing zone.


• The PLA Rocket Forces did not launch any missiles during the April 2023 exercise compared to the August 2022 exercise where eleven missiles landed into designated sea areas around Taiwan including in Japan’s exclusive economic zone. However, during the April 2023 exercise PLA Rocket Forces units conducted simulated strikes against Taiwan and possibly other locations that were not published in the press.


• The CCG announced that it would conduct boarding operations against Taiwanese flagged vessels transiting the Taiwan Straits. According to press reports, the CCG did not stop any ship. During the August 2022 exercise, the CCG did not make this notification. The April notification implied that this action would be part of a future blockade operation.


• Since August 2022, the PLA has continued to cross the median line between Taiwan and China with its aircraft and ships almost daily. The April exercise demonstrated that the PLAN and PLAAF could cross Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) multiple times, the median line and for the first time used PLAN aircraft (J-15 jets and helicopters) to cross the ADIZ from the east side.


• From August 4-15, 2022, the PLA flew a total of 205 aircraft averaging 19 aircraft a day with a peak of 49 and a low of 10. During the April 8-10, 2023 exercise, the PLA flew a total of 134 aircraft averaging 45 aircraft a day with a peak of 54 and a low of 35. This is a significant increase in the number of aircraft per day. The PLA sortied 65 percent of the August 2022 eleven day exercise in just three days (134 out of 205). Additionally, on December 25, 2022, the PLA sortied 47 aircraft in one day in response to the US government passing the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act that included strong support for Taiwan and its military. This demonstrates that the PLA continues to increase their flight capacity and capability.

Besides the August 2022 and April 2023 PLA exercises, the PLA also conducted carrier training in December 2022 highlighted by the PLAN Liaoning carrier group which conducted training approximately from December 17-31, 2022, in the western Pacific (see map below). The December training focused in an area between southern Japan and Guam.

(Twitter user @detresfa_ photo)

Messages that China wants to send

China wants to send several messages during their short deployments. First, during the April 2023 and December 2022 deployments, they demonstrated that they could deploy a carrier group into the Western Pacific Ocean. In the most recent April case, they exercised about a week in close proximity to the eastern side of Taiwan and the Southern Japanese islands (see map above). Japan, Taiwan, and the US monitored the carrier group throughout the SCG's deployment because of the close proximity to Taiwan and Japan.

Additionally, both the December and April PLA Navy carrier groups drove their ships near Guam—within 350-400 nautical miles. This places Guam within striking range of Shandong’s J-15 Shark aircraft (maximum combat range of 1270 km or 686 nautical miles) and also within range of missiles from the other ships in the carrier group.

The overall message is that the PLA Navy is exercising their forces to conduct a naval blockade around Taiwan and this time, the PLA Navy placed the Shandong on the eastern side of Taiwan to simulate blocking ships and aircraft in a future conflict.

Second, the southern islands of Japan could also be at risk for a blockade or even being taken over by the PLA since China believes these should be part of China. The message to Japan is also to stay out of a future conflict with Taiwan.

Third, the message in both carrier deployments to the Western Pacific is that the PLA Navy can place Guam or the second island chain at risk in a future conflict should the US get involved with Taiwan and other Indo-Pacific allies.