TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — A military researcher urged Taiwan to bolster coordination with the Philippines and Australia to defend the southern flank of the first island chain. 

Following the PLA's live-fire drills off Australia's east coast last week, Huang Chung-ting (黃宗鼎), a researcher with the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR), published an assessment of China's Pacific strategy on Thursday. Huang said this move raises the question of whether China has solidified its presence in the southern first island chain, enabling it to expand its reach toward the second and third island chains.

Huang said that China's strengthened infrastructure at the southern end of the first island chain is not merely a springboard for the PLA's advances but an attempt to weaken Taiwan’s defensive capabilities during a conflict.

The researcher said the PLA began increasing its force deployments in the southern sector of the first island chain around late spring 2024, with Russia playing a supporting role. He cited deployments of Chinese naval vessels to key international waterways off Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and the South China Sea in 2024. 

Huang believes there are three reasons why China has increased its military operations in the southern segment of the first island chain. First, the Spratly reefs, such as Zhubi, Meiji, and Yongshu, have been developed by China into mature military bases, effectively extending the PLA's operational range.

Second, China seeks to control the Sulu Sea, limiting the effectiveness of US Navy patrols in the South China Sea. Third, and most importantly, China wants to ensure it has an alternative route for the Malacca Strait during wartime while preparing to intercept ships transporting liquified natural gas (LNG) to Taiwan. This would undermine Taiwan's energy shipping routes and weaken Taiwan's resilience.

Huang explained that, for the distribution of Taiwan's main LNG suppliers, the maritime security of the southern section of the first island chain is crucial to Taiwan's defense resilience. Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei, which are located in the southern section of the first island chain, are the geographically closest sources of LNG for Taiwan.

He added that LNG from Australia and Papua New Guinea must also pass through the southern section of the first island chain.

Over 50% of Taiwan's LNG is imported from Australia, Papua New Guinea, and Southeast Asia. Huang said if the PLA deploys its fleet in the southern section of the first island chain, such as the Sulu Sea and Celebes Sea, and intercepts LNG carriers heading toward Taiwan, a key supply route would be cut off. 

In this scenario, Huang said China would not need to impose a blockade or quarantine on Taiwan. It could strike at Taiwan's societal morale and the government's authority.

Based on the maritime locations of the French-led La Perouse and the Pacific Steller 2025 joint exercises, the PLA rehearsed a northern and southern encirclement of the southern section of the first island chain, Huang said. 

Huang said this indicates that the US and its allies know that the PLA has increased its military presence.

The researcher said that the Pacific Steller 2025 exercise, conducted in the air and sea east of the Philippines, saw the participation of the US, Japan, and France, all deploying carrier-class capital ships. He noted that the US aircraft carrier, Carl Vinson, passed through the Mindoro Strait into the Sulu Sea to reach the exercise area, a region that was the site of the largest carrier battle of World War II, the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

Faced with a "military confrontation" pattern in the southern section of the first island chain, Huang said Taiwan should not only collaborate with the US-Japan alliance but also strengthen intelligence exchanges with the Philippines and Australia. 

On the shared issue of the "backyard becoming the frontline" in areas such as Taiwan's eastern waters, the southern Sulu Sea near the Philippines, and the eastern Tasman Sea off Australia, Huang recommended a deepening of consultations with the Philippine military, such as with the Western Mindanao Command, and the Australian military.