As Taiwan grapples with rising cross-strait military tensions, discussions around deterrence and asymmetric defense have not addressed one crucial vulnerability — the resilience of Taiwan’s energy infrastructure to electromagnetic pulse attacks.

An EMP attack uses a burst of electromagnetic energy to disrupt or destroy electronic systems, communications, and critical infrastructure. Unlike conventional air or missile strikes, they do not leave behind destroyed buildings or visible scars. Even so, their damage can be just as devastating. 

The energy production and distribution sector is the apex of critical infrastructure for modern societies, as every other infrastructure relies deeply on electronics. Therefore, disabling the energy grid would lead to a series of cascading failures, crippling the nation and leaving it in a state of paralysis. 

Taiwan’s civilian infrastructure remains dangerously underprepared.

For decades, Taiwan’s efforts to strengthen the energy grid and other critical infrastructures have centered around natural disaster preparedness for earthquakes, typhoons, and solar storms. However, this same infrastructure would also be the first line of vulnerability in a high-intensity conflict. 

In the People’s Liberation Army’s doctrine of “systems destruction warfare,” cyber and electromagnetic operations precede kinetic action, aiming to blind and paralyze the target before troops are deployed. In this context, Taiwan’s energy grid, which powers everything from hospitals to water purification systems, becomes a critical target.

While some military facilities in Taiwan have reportedly implemented shielding and hardening measures, most civilian systems — including power generation and distribution networks — adhere only to commercial safety standards. These were designed to withstand solar flares or lightning surges, not high-intensity, weapons-grade EMPs. As such, civilian infrastructure remains the weak link in Taiwan’s strategic deterrence.

EMP preparedness

One of the biggest hurdles to nationwide EMP preparedness is the division of responsibility between defense and civilian authorities. While the Ministry of National Defense recognizes the threat of electromagnetic warfare, it does not directly control the infrastructure managed by state-owned utility Taipower. 

This bureaucratic divide has created a strategic blind spot: who should pay for EMP hardening, and how should standards be enforced?

Taipower, already operating under financial strain, has limited room to absorb large-scale infrastructure upgrades on its own. Its debt ratio exceeded 90% in 2024, and electricity rates have already been raised multiple times, particularly for industrial users. 

Any additional costs are likely to trigger a public backlash. Therefore, any such hardening initiative would require substantial funding from government coffers, pending approval from a deeply divided legislature that does not even have EMP defense on its radar. In this environment, the prospect of a multi-billion-dollar EMP resilience initiative seems politically improbable.

Yet the conversation must shift. Taiwan cannot afford to treat energy resilience as a side issue or defer it entirely to the military. Instead, EMP preparation must be framed as a whole-of-society challenge. Just as the nation has invested in earthquake-resistant buildings, redundant internet cables, and pandemic stockpiles, it should also invest in ensuring that the lights stay on during a conflict.

Fortunately, many resilience measures are dual use. The decentralization of Taiwan’s grid, promoted under Taipower’s 10-year modernization plan, will not only reduce vulnerability to natural disasters but also make EMP targeting more difficult. Microgrids, renewable energy hubs, and flexible distribution nodes all offer pathways toward a more robust energy system that can continue operating under duress.

‘Gray space’

Still, these structural improvements must be complemented by clear policy mandates. Taiwan’s legislative and regulatory bodies must begin to draft minimum EMP hardening standards for critical infrastructure — not just for the military but across essential civilian sectors, from hospitals and telecoms to water utilities and transit hubs.

Perhaps the greatest obstacle is not technical, but perceptual. Unlike missile threats, EMP attacks remain invisible and unfamiliar to most of the public. They occupy a “gray space” in strategic discourse — feared by specialists but not widely discussed. 

Policymakers often assume that Beijing would not cross the nuclear threshold by deploying high-altitude EMP weapons, or HEMPs, but this assumption must be revisited. As China modernizes its nuclear arsenal and develops non-nuclear EMP delivery systems, such as hypersonic missiles equipped with high-powered microwave payloads, the likelihood of these “non-lethal” strategic weapons being used grows.

To overcome this bias, Taiwan’s government must make the EMP threat visible. Public awareness campaigns, civil defense exercises, and transparent cost-benefit analyses are crucial. A well-informed electorate is more likely to accept the financial and lifestyle tradeoffs necessary to harden infrastructure.

The cost of inaction must be weighed not only against defense spending but also against the human and economic toll of a prolonged blackout. Taiwan’s recent defense acquisitions, such as NT$230 billion (US$7.7 billion) spent on F-16 fighter jets, demonstrate the country’s willingness to invest in national security. 

A modest fraction of that sum could be redirected toward building infrastructure that protects not only soldiers on the battlefield but also civilians at home.

As President Lai Ching-te's (賴清德) administration doubles down on asymmetric defense, EMP resilience should be a central pillar. The conversation must move beyond the barracks and into boardrooms, city halls, and utility control rooms. 

Only through a unified civil-defense approach can Taiwan begin to close what we believe to be the most critical gap in its national resilience – EMP defense.

*Tin Pak is a visiting scholar at the National Defense University.
*Chen Yu-cheng is an associate professor at the National Defense University.