A recent two-day wargame, organized by the Taipei School of Economics and Political Science Foundation and planned by Taiwan’s former Chief of the General Staff Admiral Lee Hsi-min (李喜明), featuring strategic insights from former US Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen and a dedicated US team, offered a chillingly realistic glimpse into a potential cross-strait conflict. 

The political-military exercise explored scenarios around a Chinese military campaign against Taiwan. The following insights, drawn from the entire game, offer urgent lessons for leaders in Taipei, Washington, and Tokyo. This author was part of the US team.

The exercise delivered a clear and unequivocal message: supporting Taiwan politically and militarily is crucial to maintaining peace and security in the region. More importantly, it underscored that Taiwan's future hinges on its unwavering will to fight, its embrace of asymmetric capabilities, and its robust preparations to counter Beijing's "Intimidate, Coerce, Punish, and Occupy" strategy. The fundamental assumption is that President Trump must explain to Americans why Taiwan matters and instruct the Pentagon to execute the war plan.

The wargame's overarching principle for the US and allies was clear: respond early and respond big to serve as a strong deterrent. This necessitates a decisive show of force, starting with the pre-positioning of US forces in the Western Pacific, a critical strategy to defeat the "tyranny of distance." 

A minimum of three US aircraft carrier battle groups would be required, alongside the eventual deployment of the US Marines' Marine Littoral Regiment, capable of supporting a wide range of scenarios, including those involving sea denial and sea control operations to Taiwan. US military assets established in the Philippines in recent years would play a significant role in countering any blockade and defeating the PLA. 

Overall, the US believes it is more capable of countering China now than it was ten years ago, with the US expecting to require approximately 2-3 weeks for full force arrival, a notable improvement from the 28 days estimated in 2014.

Crucially, the wargame highlighted that the US military's response is contingent upon its commander-in-chief explaining to the American people why Taiwan matters. Furthermore, a secret communication channel to Beijing would be established early to warn them against aggression, recognizing that an uncontrolled downward spiral is a constant concern and de-escalation a critical issue.

The US is prepared to convey secretly that, should the PLA attack Taiwan, Washington will recognize Taiwan as an independent country, anticipating US allies to follow suit, much like the Kosovo precedent in 2008. This political gesture, if deterrence fails, is seen as vital for significantly boosting Taiwan's morale and encouraging continued resistance. It would also obligate the US to defend the independent, democratic country.

However, the burden of defense does not solely rest on external support. The wargame starkly questioned Taiwan's will to fight, emphasizing that strong civilian leadership, akin to Ukraine's Zelensky, is paramount. 

Without it, the country's will to fight could quickly dissipate, leading to military dissolution after a first wave of attack. Capitulation is not an option. Safeguarding sovereignty is directly tied to boosting morale and the spirit to fight, and the Taiwanese leadership must do everything within its power to prevent a fait accompli before US forces can arrive.

Taiwan’s military readiness also faced scrutiny by the US team. The government’s capabilities to protect civil infrastructure, especially electricity, remain in doubt. 

The massive gap in capabilities and training means Taiwan’s submarines, for instance, would need to get out of the way to avoid friendly fire in the event of a military conflict.

The clarity of Taiwan's rules of engagement, particularly in terms of political directives, remains unclear and requires urgent clarification. 

As does its understanding and response to China’s grey zone operations, which are inherently political and military. The vulnerability of Taiwan's offshore islands, such as Dongsha and Nansha, even with significantly reduced forces in recent years, was noted as a critical risk for hostage-taking. Kinmen and Matsu are vulnerable and could become liabilities for Taiwan. Moreover, Taiwan must refine its reserve mobilization processes to ensure its forces can be activated rapidly and defend the country effectively.

In the event of conflict, the simulated operations revealed the multi-faceted response required from the US and its allies:

Command and Control (C2): Robust C2 among the US, Japan, and Taiwan is the most basic element. The US would send C2 elements to Taiwan early to assist the Ministry of National Defense and activate robust intelligence sharing to ensure operational C2.

Offensive Operations: The US Navy's early priority would be to sink PLA aircraft carriers and amphibious landing ships, which are large and attractive targets. US submarines would be unleashed to fire at will, interdicting as many PLA ships as possible to prevent an amphibious landing. Offensive cyber operations would disrupt the PLA's systems, and US space assets would be redeployed and targeted to support all operations. The US will launch offensive psychological operations (PSYOPS) behind enemy lines to warn the Chinese population of the looming war. Both Taiwan and the US would strike PLA's C2, missile batteries, ports, and airbases in China. If the PLA landed in northeast Taiwan, critical infrastructure like tunnels to Taipei and Route 9 would need to be destroyed. The question of how to make China's pre-positioned forces viable targets was also raised.

Counter-Blockade and Logistics: A blockade is an act of war, regardless of whether China calls it a "judicial quarantine." Naval blockades have consistently been treated as acts of war or triggers for war, as demonstrated by the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. To counter this, the US and coalition forces (Japan and Australia at a minimum) would keep three corridors open: between Japan and Taiwan, between Taiwan and the Philippines, and from the Malacca Strait to the Philippines. US assets in the Philippines would significantly aid in countering the blockade and defeating the PLA. Australia would boost efforts to choke off China’s energy supply in critical chokepoints, such as the South China Sea. China's maritime militia and coast guard are viewed as distractions rather than decisive tools for the PLA.

The US would prioritize supporting Taiwan’s essential supplies (energy, food, medical, and ammunition), establishing an air bridge, and increasing humanitarian flights and ships out of Taiwan. Escort operations for merchant ships, requiring at least 10 sorties per day and significant naval assets, were highlighted as a challenge given the Taiwan Navy's limited experience with the US Navy and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force in such operations. Simply put, China faces logistical and operational challenges in any blockade or invasion attempt.

Coalition Roles: Japan would follow the US lead, with the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force conducting joint patrols and supporting US bomber fleets. Japan could potentially provide 24 frigates for escort operations. While Russia's joint exercises and North Korea's missile flyovers might complicate the situation, they would not alter Japan’s security calculus, as Taiwan remains the primary objective for the US. Washington would also warn North Korea and Russia to avoid further complicating the situation.

The core dilemma of whether a strong response makes war more or less likely remains. However, the wargame implicitly suggested that, facing a formidable coalition, China might reconsider. The logical corollary is that if China is preparing to invade Taiwan in 2027 and deter US intervention, waiting until the PLA is fully prepared might not be the optimal strategy.

Ultimately, the wargame serves as a powerful call to action. Taiwan must not capitulate. Its path forward involves a comprehensive strategy built on self-reliance, continuous military modernization focused on asymmetric capabilities, and robust civil defense.

This is not merely a military challenge, but a whole-of-society undertaking. As the exercise participants affirmed, "We're in a struggle for independence. We will prevail. We will win!" But victory demands preparation, resolve, and close cooperation with allies who understand that Taiwan's future is inextricably linked to regional and global stability.

We are in a struggle for independence. The US and coalition allies are prepared, and Taiwan must not stand alone. But victory requires unity, planning, and political courage. Taiwan must do everything to delay PLA success before help arrives. America and its allies must show they are willing to act, and not just speak.

The wargame simulation is over, but the real test is still to come.