Former President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) said in 2022 that “only by preparing for war can we avoid it, and only by being capable of fighting a war can we stop one.”
This statement set the tone for a military force realignment plan to address a long-standing issue in the country’s defense posture: its conscription system and the broader question of the attractiveness and functionality of military service.
The urgency of reform lies in the deadlock that Taiwan faces. For years, the armed forces have struggled to attract new recruits and maintain an effective reserve system. The length of service has been repeatedly reduced, and conscription remains unpopular among younger generations.
Despite this difficult starting point, Taipei has recently taken steps to reverse the trend. Since January 2024, a new one-year conscription program has been in operation.
Without a reliable, modern, and credible conscription system, the country exposes one of its biggest vulnerabilities. Namely, growing uncertainty about its security environment — marked by doubts over Taiwan’s military readiness, declining trust in US security commitments, waning confidence in US-Taiwan relations, and skepticism toward Washington as a reliable partner.
What has changed
The new plan introduced under the Tsai administration forms part of a broader effort to reinforce Taiwan’s defense capabilities. At the center of this reform is the recognition that the previous four-month training system was no longer adequate.
Weaknesses in readiness, insufficient training, a declining pool of volunteers, and a fragmented reserve structure had all become too apparent to ignore. To address these deficits and make conscription more attractive, the government introduced four key measures.
First, the military training curriculum was strengthened and capacity expanded. Second, wages for conscripts were significantly increased. Third, time spent in mandatory service now counts toward labor pension contributions. Lastly, the Ministry of Education has implemented a “3+1” program in which conscripts can complete college in three years and their military duties in one year.
However, this transformation goes deeper, it introduces a comprehensive restructuring of Taiwan’s defense architecture around four key components.
A professional main battle force of 210,000 troops, including 180,000 active-duty volunteers, will serve as the core combat unit.
A standing garrison force, composed mainly of conscripts, will be tasked with territorial defense, infrastructure protection, and civil defense support. This replaces the slower, less prepared reservist model.
A civil defense system will integrate government agencies, alternative service personnel, and private sector resources to handle disaster relief, emergency repairs, and public safety.
The reserve force will be reorganized: retired volunteers will reinforce the main force, while former conscripts will support the garrison, enabling rapid local mobilization in wartime.
These changes aim to streamline responsibilities, enhance coordination, and make training more targeted and effective.
Contrasting results
Implementation, however, has faced considerable challenges. Indeed, only 6,900 men completed the new one-year service, around 6% of the eligible cohort. This low intake was due to widespread deferments for those pursuing higher education.
Training goals have also been difficult to meet. Reports indicate that only the domestically produced Kestrel rockets have been widely available for training.
Shortages of US-supplied Stinger and Javelin missiles have limited hands-on instruction to technical briefings. The Ministry of National Defense has attempted to fill these gaps through simulators and domestic production requests, but results remain uneven.
This echoes a more general issue with late deliveries from US defense companies. Equipment shortages have delayed the plans to improve training for the reserves.
In January, opposition-led budget cuts targeted areas of the military budget which, while not directly affecting the conscription program, could undermine day-to-day operations and long-term readiness.
Learning from Switzerland
In searching for models, Taiwan could take inspiration from countries like Switzerland, where conscription is widely accepted, and public trust in the military remains high. Switzerland’s “citizen-soldier” system normalizes service as a civic duty, offers refresher training, and allows conscripts to remain integrated in professional life.
While contexts differ, Taiwan could adapt some core elements: civic education on national defense, flexible service models, and structured post-service reintegration.
Crucially, Switzerland frames military service as part of a social contract, not a state imposition. Restoring that sense of collective ownership is something Taiwan still struggles with, but that could help strengthen civil-military relations.
Taiwan’s conscription reform represents a necessary response to structural deficiencies in the country’s defense system and to the growing China threat. Even so, necessity alone does not guarantee success.
Public opinion reflects this complexity. A recent survey conducted by the Institute of National Defense and Security Research in March showed that 51% of Taiwanese support raising the defense budget, marking a four-point increase since January and surpassing the majority threshold for the first time. This suggests growing recognition of the need for sustained investment in national defense.
However, confidence in the military itself has slightly declined. The share of respondents expressing “strong confidence” dropped from 20% in September 2024 to 14% in March, while those expressing “no confidence” rose from 25% to 30%.
Road ahead
Yet despite these mixed perceptions, public willingness to defend Taiwan remains steady: 41% of respondents said they are “very willing to fight for Taiwan,” nearly unchanged from 42% six months earlier. Even under mounting Chinese pressure and ongoing uncertainty in US policy, Taiwanese resolve appears intact.
The restructuring of Taiwan’s armed forces forms part of a broader effort by the DPP to enhance national defense, an effort that has been underway since 2019. As reflected in steadily increasing military expenditure — set to continue under President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) — Taipei is taking concrete steps to improve both the capabilities and credibility of its military forces.
The introduction of more rigorous training, better pay and benefits for conscripts, and flexible educational pathways are all aimed at making military service more effective and socially accepted.
The appointment of Wellington Koo (顧立雄) as defense minister further underscores the government’s commitment to meaningful reform, and introduces a new setting for Taiwan’s civil-military relations. His emphasis on asymmetric warfare, real-time exercises, and national defense autonomy reflects a deeper understanding of Taiwan’s unique security challenges, and a determination to address them with both urgency and innovation.
Challenges remain, particularly in scaling up training infrastructure, appeasing conscripts’ anxieties, and ensuring a political consensus. But Taiwan’s efforts to rebuild and modernize its conscription system deserve recognition. Rather than viewing service as a burden, the government is working to reframe it as a meaningful contribution to national security and democratic resilience.
Ultimately, Taiwan is not just reforming its military, it is reimagining what it means to defend a free society in an era of uncertainty. That transformation, if sustained, may become one of its greatest strategic assets.
