In its latest attempt to legally shape the narrative surrounding Taiwan’s sovereignty, China's national legislature voted to designate Oct. 25 as the end of Japan’s occupation of Taiwan in 1945. 

Shen Chunyao (沈春耀), director of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee's Legislative Affairs Commission, commented that this would “help honor the indisputable fact that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.”  

China’s “Commemoration Day of Taiwan’s Restoration” is part of its lawfare strategy, or the systemic use of domestic and international laws to legitimize its claims regarding Taiwan’s sovereignty. In this context, law becomes a political instrument.

Although international law remains far more complex regarding Taiwan’s status, China has continuously tried to impose its vision upon the international community. Beijing has long blurred the line between domestic legality and international legitimacy, invoking the “one China” principle as if it were a legally binding rule rather than a diplomatic understanding.

Through its legal framework, China seeks to performatively change the status quo in its favor. These moves are meant to condition the international community into accepting a particular narrative as legally grounded. 

Without clearly defined legal boundaries, such actions could help the Chinese Communist Party place the world before a fait accompli. At this point, the entire legal architecture supports its claim that Taiwan’s sovereignty issue has already been resolved.

Therefore, the international legal order represents another arena in which both Taiwan and the international community must invest efforts to safeguard peace and clarity across the Taiwan Strait.

Legal uncertainty  

International law remains ambiguous regarding Taiwan’s status. In 1951, the San Francisco Peace Treaty, followed by the 1952 Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, stated that “Japan renounces all right, title, and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores” but neither treaty designated any state as the recipient of these territories. 

Is Taiwan’s status really that ambiguous? 

It depends on who interprets the law. According to the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration, and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender, the US, the UK, and Japan stated clearly that Taiwan and the Penghu Islands would be restored to the Republic of China (Taiwan).

But what matters today, however, is how the international community positions itself on the matter –– and this is where ambiguity makes a difference. The fact that Taiwan’s status is now seen as never legally settled has allowed China to advance its claims over Taiwan’s sovereignty and to portray the “one China” principle as a widely accepted norm.

Notably, the United Nations Resolution 2758, which restored China’s seat at the UN, makes no mention of Taiwan’s status. Yet Beijing repeatedly invokes it as evidence the UN recognizes Taiwan as part of China, a claim rejected by the EU.

International law follows the same logic as the economic, diplomatic, and military arenas –– the strongest often prevails. This reality favors Beijing, which is able to transform its leverage into a coercive and deterrent tool.

Symbolic law to coercive strategy

The creation of “Commemoration Day of Taiwan’s Restoration” mirrors previous examples of how China transforms symbolic law into instruments of pressure. Domestically, such acts consolidate national identity and reinforce the narrative of an “unfinished unification.” 

Internationally, they signal that any foreign support to Taiwan challenges both Beijing’s political stance and legal order. This alignment of legal rhetoric with coercive measures characterizes China’s “three warfares” and gray-zone strategies, where information, economic, and military tools converge to pressure Taiwan.

The 2005 Anti-Secession Law stands as one of the clearest examples of Beijing’s lawfare strategy. Article 8 stipulates: “In the event that the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause Taiwan's secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

The law grants China exclusive authority to determine when diplomatic paths have been exhausted and when non-peaceful measures become justified. This effectively allows Beijing to unilaterally define what constitutes a provocation or red line. 

In doing so, the Anti-Secession Law transforms legal language into a tool that enables China to legitimize the potential use of force under a self-defined interpretation of law. With the Anti-Secession Law, China has built a domestic legal justification for the potential use of force against Taiwan while effectively denying the Taiwanese the right to self-determination.

The 2024 Anti-Taiwan Independence Provisions, which criminalize actions by Taiwan’s government and citizens that go against China’s “national unity,” represent one of the latest attempts to expand Beijing’s jurisdiction over Taiwan and to control the narrative surrounding the island’s sovereignty.

Lawfare serves China’s gray-zone techniques by compelling Taiwan to carefully balance its national policies, spreading fear among Taiwanese by deepening uncertainty, and narrowing third parties’ engagement with Taipei while further isolating the nation.

China’s use of legal instruments to redefine the cross-strait status highlights the risks of allowing unilateral interpretations to shape international narratives. This makes the defense of legal clarity and collective norms a central task for preserving peace in the Taiwan Strait.

Countering unilateral legal narratives

Facing China’s use of lawfare, Taiwan and those who oppose any unilateral attempt to alter the status quo must work to safeguard international law to effectively counter China’s coercive posture.

For Taiwan, increasing its legal readiness is critical. Taiwan’s continuous alignment with international law and conventions into domestic legislation reinforces its image as a rule-of-law model and raises the cost of aggression for China. Moreover, China’s unlawful arguments must be countered through consistent rebuttal and the creation of preemptive counter-narratives such as “Taiwan Retrocession Day,” which was celebrated as a national holiday on Oct. 25 this year.

Finally, lawfare, like any other gray-zone technique, is particularly effective because of Taiwan’s internal divisions. Lai Ching-te’s (賴清德) administration, as well as opposition parties, must understand that political competition can thrive without undermining national security. A more cohesive society would be better equipped to confront China’s lawfare strategy.

Such measures must be reinforced by the international community’s engagement on the matter, whose leverage over the international law is greater than Taiwan’s. Notably, there is a need to expose and condemn China’s legal distortion and lawfare, support Taiwan’s international integration where feasible, and firmly oppose any unilateral attempt to shape the status quo.

Only by standing against unilateral interpretations and reaffirming collective respect for international law can the international community preserve stability in the strait and the credibility of the global rules-based order.