In late 2024, the Legislative Yuan passed amendments to the Constitutional Litigation Act that tightened quorum and voting thresholds for the Constitutional Court; on Friday, the Court sought to strike those changes down — and did so at a session the author argues was “unlawful” because too few justices were present.
The amendment raised the bar for deliberations. At least 10 justices had to be present to form a quorum, regardless of vacancies.
For a declaration of unconstitutionality, at least 9 justices had to agree — a supermajority that let a lone dissent block invalidation.
If the Court could not reach quorum due to vacancies or recusals, the remaining justices could meet only for non-constitutional matters, such as procedure or temporary injunctions.
Supporters said these rules would prevent paralysis; critics said the legislature was micromanaging the judiciary. By dictating head-counts and vote thresholds, the law, they argued, encroached on judicial independence and separation of powers.
Soon after passage, the Court faced a hard test. With only eight justices seated and three declining to participate, just five were available. The amended law required 10 for quorum.
The Court convened anyway. On Dec. 19, 2025, a plenary session met with five justices and issued a ruling on the amendment. In the author’s framing, that session was “unlawful” under the new statute — a deliberate act of judicial self-assertion against legislative interference.
The ruling voided the amendment on two grounds. First, separation of powers: the legislature, the Court held, cannot set the Court’s internal quorum and supermajority rules for constitutional review.
Second, flaws in lawmaking: the Court said the amendment’s passage showed “obvious and significant flaws” in procedure and departed from constitutional requirements, undermining its legitimacy.
Striking the new provisions restored the pre-amendment regime. The Court could function with a smaller quorum (six) and a simple majority (five of nine) for declarations of unconstitutionality, allowing constitutional cases to proceed and averting paralysis.
The decision’s implications are wider than one statute. It reaffirms that the Constitution is supreme and that courts must be free to interpret it without legislative micromanagement.
Yet politics still looms. The amendment originated with a legislative majority seeking to keep the Court working despite vacancies. The Court’s choice to meet with too few justices — and then to void the law — will be read by some as an extraordinary assertion of judicial power.
The episode also exposes a persistent problem: too many empty seats. Running with eight of 15 justices stresses the system and invites hard-edge confrontations over process. Expect renewed pressure to fill vacancies and stabilize the Court’s composition.
In an unusual move, the ruling itself acknowledged the irregular session. That self-critique aimed to preserve credibility while defending constitutional duty: the Court said it acted under duress to uphold the basic order.
The larger lesson is about balance. Legislative attempts to constrain the Court can trigger backlash; judicial efforts to defend independence can look exceptional. Taiwan now faces the task of ensuring an effective Constitutional Court while safeguarding separation of powers — so constitutional guarantees are more than words on paper.
